



PRE-REVOLUTION
BRITISH NATIONAL MILITIA
AND
OUR NATIONAL GUARD



To you, who have demonstrated your patriotic devotion to matters of National Defense and proper preparedness, this book is sent with the Compliments of the Season, in the hope that you will find in its text matters of historical information that will be not only interesting and instructive, but that will inspire you in your patriotic efforts to carry on.

You will note the English book was published anonymously to the British Government in 1745; that our plan of citizen soldiery was originated by General Washington and General Baron von Steuben, and finally these early suggestions became the bases of the organization of our present National Guard component in the National Defense System of the United States.

Indicating that this early English suggestion bore fruit, the last report of the British Army shows a Territorial Army (which compares with our National Guard) having a strength of 7,036 officers and 130,007 in other ranks, totaling 137,043. Its regular force consists of 11,847 officers and 190,165 in other ranks, totaling 202,012. During the World War the Territorial Army of Great Britain, engaged in combat, comprised 236,000 officers and men.

Cordially yours,

Chicago, Illinois
December 25, 1936

To Machir Dorsey:—

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

For Keelm



A
P L A N
FOR
ESTABLISHING AND
DISCIPLINING
A
National Militia
IN
GREAT BRITAIN,
I R E L A N D,
AND
In all the BRITISH DOMINIONS
of A M E R I C A.

L O N D O N :

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M D C C X L V.

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THE following plan supposes, that the common soldiers of our present army shall be disbanded of course, when their officers are incorporated with the national militia : because disbanding them will contribute not only to the public wealth, by adding many more useful hands to mechanic arts and husbandry, but to the improvement of the militia discipline, by so many expert soldiers residing in every part of the kingdom. At the same time it must be the most grateful reward of their past labours, to release them from the sanguinary lashes of martial law ; allowing them the privilege of Englishmen, to acquire a much better subsistence, upon the common fruits of industry, with a participation of the public liberty.

I N T R O-

T H E

INTRODUCTION;

In answer to the general Objections against a MILITIA.

HOW well soever any government may be constituted for internal safety, its existence cannot be of long duration, if unprovided with military strength proportionate to its extent and situation, and sufficient to repel external force. Neither riches nor populousness are able to give security to a nation untrained to arms; for multitudes unskilful in the art of war can defend their possessions no better than flocks of sheep
a their

their pastures. The innumerable, undisciplined hosts of Persia fled before the little veteran army of Macedon. The immense riches of that vast empire were only temptations to Alexander's ambition, without being the means of its defence.

It is indeed an old maxim, that riches are the sinews of war ; but this is true in no other sense, except for the maintenance and pay of armies, when in the field, and in foreign countries : “ in
“ other respects the apothegm *
“ is false ; for money cannot
“ make good soldiers. Princes
“ who rely upon their treasure as
“ sufficient

* See Machiavel, page 345. Fol. Ed.

“ sufficient to defend them, do
 “ not consider, that if money
 “ could have done it Darius
 “ would have conquer’d Alex-
 “ ander ; the Grecians the Ro-
 “ mans ; and duke Charles the
 “ Switzers : but they presuming
 “ upon the multitude of their
 “ bags more than the goodness
 “ of their men, were all over-
 “ come. Cræsus the king of
 “ Lydia carrying Solon into his
 “ treasury, and shewing him an
 “ immense quantity of riches,
 “ asked him what he thought of
 “ his power ; to which the phi-
 “ losopher replied, I think it ne-
 “ ver the greater for this ; be-
 “ cause battles are fought more
 “ with iron than gold ; and it

a 2

“ may

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“ may happen that somebody will
“ come with his iron, and take
“ it all from you This actu-
“ ally happened to the king of
“ Macedon, who being upon the
“ point of concluding a peace
“ with the Gauls, then transf-
“ planted to Greece, shewed their
“ ambassadors his treasury full
“ of silver and gold ; which they
“ no sooner had seen, but long-
“ ing impatiently to be at it,
“ broke off the treaty, and ruined
“ his country. The Venetians,
“ in the meridian of their pro-
“ sperity, had their coffers well
“ stored, but depending upon
“ their money, they lost all.”
And if other nations should
trust their defence to armies of
foreign

foreign mercenaries, they cannot hope for better success against invaders ; nor can the paymasters, whether kings or republicks, secure themselves from becoming a prey to their own hirelings.

THE just fear of such an event has probably deterred most governments from resting their whole defence upon so precarious a bottom ; but yet the alternative commonly chosen is a security very little preferable : for, tho' standing armies should be composed of natives, and members of the same society, which they are intended to protect, yet whenever they become a distinct body of mercenaries, making the profession of

arms the only means of subsistence, their interest is opposite to that of the people in general : because war *, tumult and plunder are not less subversive of national felicity, than they are the necessary means by which mercenary soldiers can prosper ; besides, their pay is at best a grievous burthen upon public industry.

It is very true that many officers of the British army are men of great fortune, or high quality.
All

* A well-constituted kingdom or commonwealth will not suffer any of their citizens or subjects, or any other good men, to make war their profession ; for he can never be thought a good man, who takes upon him an employment, by which, if he would reap any profit, he is obliged to be false, rapacious, cruel, &c. See Machiavel, chap. 2. page 438.

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All these have an interest in the peace and civil prosperity of this kingdom, superior to their private interest as soldiers. From such there cannot be much apprehension of danger, if ambition, and the lust of power, are not taken into the consideration ; nor from any others, who retain a true sense of honour, and love for their country. To all these my plan cannot be unacceptable, which incorporates the officers of the present army with the national militia, allowing them full pay for life, as able masters, well qualified to teach the art of discipline to those corps which they may command ; for that scheme cements their private with the

public interest. This therefore is doing justice to them, consistently with prudence and good policy. But to frame an engine for public defence, like a mercenary army, which may probably recoil upon the contrivers, is absolutely repugnant to both: for what can hinder such an army from enslaving and destroying their fellow-subjects unarmed, and undisciplined, whenever their ambition or wants require it? Thus every government depending upon that support, runs daily the desperate hazard of being subverted by its intended protectors. Numerous exemplifications to this purpose are needless, since antient and modern history
abound

abound with fatal instances. The Roman * emperors were often dethroned by those legions which were the instruments of their power : the Ottoman empire often
struggles

* Octavius first, and afterwards Tiberius, (preferring their private power to the public good) began to disarm the people, (that they might have them more easily at command) and to keep standing armies upon the frontiers of their empire. But because they thought them insufficient to curb the people, and awe the senate of Rome, they established another army, (called the Prætorian) which was quartered always about the city, as if intended for a guard : but when afterwards the emperors permitted them to lay aside all other professions, and devote themselves to war, they grew insolent immediately, and became not only terrible to the senate, but pernicious to the emperors ; inso-
much, that many of them were put to death by the fury of those soldiers, who created and deposed their emperors as they pleased : and sometimes it fell out that several emperors were created by several armies at the same time, which occasioned the division first, and by degrees the destruction of the empire. See Machiavel, page 440.

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struggles under such convulsions : Russia owes its present Empress to the royal guard of her predecessor : and every king or republic, under the same circumstances, is necessarily exposed to the like revolutions.

NEVERTHELESS, to blind the eyes of mankind, and to render mercenary armies less suspected and odious, state-craft, for the promotion of lawless power, has too often exercised its wicked art in persuading the world, that none but such are capable of defending nations against foreigners of the same sort : and prostitute wit, ever fawning upon power for the sake of luxury, has without

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out shame joined in the general ridicule of a militia, and flattered the mercenary soldier ; as if * a pitiful daily pay, spent in debauchery, and a particular dress, were the only means of inspiring bravery, and supporting discipline. But neither the varnish
of

* From the history of the Romans it may be observed, how unsafe it is to commit the defence of our affairs to a mercenary army, who have nothing to encourage them but a pitiful pay, which is not considerable enough to make them so faithful as to lay down their lives in your quarrel : for if an army is not bound to the person for whom they fight by particular obligations, such as the defence of their country, posterity and religion, they will not exert their courage : so that it is necessary for every king, who desires to defend himself well, to train up his subjects in military discipline, that he may safely depend upon them in time of distress : and this has been the practice of all those who have done any great things. See Machiavel, page 312.

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of one, nor the raillery of the other, ought to prejudice mankind against plain and obvious truth ; tho' it is too evident, that they have been amazingly successful in establishing mercenary armies all over Europe, except in Switzerland : for what are called the militia of France, Spain, Italy and Sweden, are but different kinds of mercenary armies ; all kept in pay of some sort, and subject to martial law.

It is not however my design to enter formally into a minute discussion of the point, how far a national militia is preferable in every respect to a mercenary army ; for, that the following plan will
clearly

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clearly evince : It shall therefore be my endeavour in this place to shew as concisely as possible, that no mercenary army, which this kingdom can support without becoming bankrupt, is sufficient for its security against foreign invasion ; and yet a national militia is capable of defending it with great certainty, and little expence.

EVERY one moderately skilled in the revenues of this nation, mortgaged to future generations, and strained so high by excessive taxes, sees at first glance, that besides the necessary expence of the navy, and all the other charges of government, grown exorbitant
by

xxx INTRODUCTION.

by the luxury of courtiers, it is not possible to support long the present army without ruin; much less is it able to maintain a greater number: but yet, if a mercenary army of an hundred thousand men were quartered equally near our sea-coasts, at least eighteen hundred miles in circumference, it is hardly credible that five thousand of them could be mustered at any one place, with expedition enough to prevent a sudden invasion. And if an enemy once gain footing in a country like ours, destitute of fortified towns, what ravages may not be committed upon a people unarmed, before a number of mercenaries could

could be drawn together sufficient to stop the devastation ?

BUT a national militia (such as that of Great Britain might be) consisting of two millions cantoned without expence in their usual habitations all over this kingdom, will be infinitely superior in every place where an enemy may land, to any number which can be transported over the sea at once : and therefore, without the aid of our fleets, such a militia well-disciplined is able, not only to defend us from invasion, but to secure us from the insult of any neighbour, or even the united powers of the continent. Feints or threats of
that

that kind, which now alarm, and obstruct the necessary operations of war, could not under such an happy circumstance give the least interruption to the public tranquillity ; nor so much as suspend any man's ordinary business, even in the places most exposed, when every one knows himself provided with arms and skill, and is sure of being joined at the shortest warning by others as well qualified as himself, and in numbers sufficient to repel any attempt that can be made.

It is far from my intention to undervalue the importance of the British navy ; for certainly it is the glory, and no less at present
the

the bulwark of this kingdom, as it must always continue to be the only safeguard of its navigation and commerce. But were a national militia well established and disciplined, and by that means our coasts absolutely secured from all invasion, no part of the navy need be detained in port; where, even in that case, it might become useless by contrary winds; but the whole might act with redoubled force upon the coasts of our enemies.

UNDER such circumstances this island, instead of wanting alliances upon the continent, must be courted by every power fearful of oppression. No perfidy, slug-

b

gishness,

gishness, or selfish views of allies, could shake our political resolves, or force us to the intolerable expence of subsidies for the support of foreign troops : nor could the neutrality of those we now depend upon most for assistance, retard our operations, or compel us to any unjust or dishonourable peace, for the extension of their commerce, upon the ruins of our trade and navigation.

SUCH a body of armed men, as this island might furnish, more numerous than all the mercenaries of Europe in conjunction, would not only be able to protect it against any opposition, but at all times, and on the most sudden

den occasions, to avenge its injuries upon any power of the continent, with more force, and better foldiers, because freemen, than can be furnished by the united mercenaries of France and Spain. His Majesty might then raife upon the moft fudden emergency an army of volunteers well difciplined, to man his fleets, (fo far as landmen can be ferviceable) or for any foreign expedition ; who, as foon as the occafion of their taking arms ceafed, would return to their habitations and * em-

b 2

ploy-

* Those kings, who defire to live in fafety and peace, ought to have their armies compofed of fuch perfons, as when there is a neceffity of war, will take up arms freely for the defence of their country ; and when peace is concluded, will as readily acquiefce, and return to their old habitations and callings. See Machiavel, page 441.

ployments, without further burthen to the public, or disadvantage to themselves.

SUCH a land-force, added to the maritime strength of Great Britain, must render it the terror of its enemies, and the safe-guard of Europe. Our monarch would then indeed hold the balance of power: not only the most distant territories of Britain, but his Majesty's foreign dominions also, and whatever state he pleases to favour, might rest in perfect tranquillity, when no potentate of Europe would dare to offend so mighty a power, as a nation populous like ours, and well trained to arms. For Bri-

I

tain,

tain, as a free state, has this advantage over the absolute monarchies of Europe, that it may trust safely all its subjects with arms, whereas those cannot *. In regard to what is feared by some, lest any among the rabble might excite them to make use of their arms to the disturbance of the public peace, I trust the following plan effectually provides against every evil of that sort, and will therefore dissipate all such apprehensions.

It is needless to say more in favour of a national militia, since it already appears evidently to be a much better means of security

b 3 against

* See Machiavel, P. 444. Fol. Ed. 3^d.

against invasion, than any mercenary army which we are able to support ; but if the two institutions were considered with regard to the preservation of public liberty, the former surpasses the latter beyond all comparison ; so far, that to prove the preference by a long train of arguments, seems distrustful the common sense of mankind.

NEVERTHELESS some playwrights, and many state-witlings, have taken frequent occasions of ridiculing a militia in general, under the false colours of the particular nominal militia of London. But tho' a band of porters, (the substitutes of indolence)

lence) badly armed, and not at all disciplined, are fit objects of ridicule, because making a shew of what they really are not ; will therefore a regular, well-disciplined militia be so too ? What says the witling to the militia of Switzerland, the only army properly called a militia in all Europe ? Is that a ridiculous army, which, without barrier towns, and bordering upon the greatest potentates of the continent, have preserved their country free, and in profound tranquillity, with respect to foreign invasion, for more than two centuries ? Thirteen hundred of this militia routed the arch-duke Leopold's army at the

INTRODUCTION.

battle of Morgarten *, and killed above twice their own number of the enemy. In the battle of Sempach, where the same archduke lost his life, twenty thousand of his mercenary forces were defeated by sixteen hundred of those Switzers. At Wesen, in the canton of Glaris, three hundred and fifty of this † militia won

* See page 212 of Stanyan's account of Switzerland.

† Mr Stanyan, in his account of Switzerland, runs a parallel between these three battles, and those surprising acts of valour performed by the Grecians against the mighty armies of Darius and Xerxes, at Marathon, Thermopylæ, and Plataea. " The battle
 " of Wesen (says he) may not only be compared to that of Thermopylæ, but seems
 " to be a copy of it that exceeded the original : for as 300 Spartans attacked the
 " Persians at that narrow pass, and all perished in the attempt ; so 350 Switzers
 " not

won the field of battle from a regular army of eight thousand Austrians. Not that these were men of less natural courage ; for the Austrian bravery has been often signalized by victory, when as mercenaries they fought against mercenaries ; but when for a paltry pay they invaded the natural rights of a brave free people formed into a regular militia, and fighting in defence of their country,

“ not only attacked in such another pass an
“ army of eight thousand Austrians, but
“ gained the field of battle. Eleven pillars,
“ (the monuments of this victory) are now
“ to be seen in that glorious field, to mark
“ the place where the Switzers rallied : for
“ their history says, that they were repulsed
“ ten times, but rallying the eleventh, broke
“ the enemy’s army, and put them to flight
“ with great slaughter.” See page 212, and
213.

try, the Auftrians were not able to stand before them.

Not to draw more proofs from other nations, by the annals of our own country it appears, that the atchievements of mercenary armies, even in foreign wars, are not to be compared with the famous victories of Cressy, Poictiers, and Azincourt *, won by our British kings at the head of
their

* The late duke of Marlborough's victories are justly celebrated, as illustrious monuments of British glory, but yet not to be compared with these, because not atchieved at so great a disparity of numbers, and other disadvantageous circumstances.

It is remarkable, that nine of the greatest military exploits recorded in history were performed (not by mercenary armies, but) by well trained militias, at Marathon, Thermopylæ, Plataea, Morgarten, Sempach, Wefen, Cressy, Poictiers, and Azincourt.

their militias. Henry the eighth, not so renowned as Edward and his son for military prowess, invaded France with a militia, “and
“ tho’ the English had no wars
“ for thirty years, nor officers
“ nor foldiers who had ever seen
“ a battle, they attacked and
“ vanquished the French, whose
“ officers were excellent, and
“ foldiers very good, by being
“ trained for several years toge-
“ ther in the Italian wars *.”
Hath not Britain still as many brave men as ever? How much therefore to blame are those in power, who neglecting to establish a national militia, made invincible by good discipline, expose their country

* See Machiavel, page 293.

country to destruction, by rejecting the only infallible means of its safety? How worthy of public resentment are all those gentlemen of fortune, who from motives of mere indolence should grudge their personal service to the militia, though it would be much less labour than their common recreations, or field sports, and much less exercise, than is necessary, even for the preservation of health? What will such gentlemen think of themselves, when reduced by invasion and conquest to a state of wretched poverty, and to a slavish dependance on the will of a tyrannical conqueror, under the influence of a rapacious, insatiable, domineering

neering clergy? A fate not unmeet for those, who neglecting the necessary means of safety in their power, sacrifice the public liberty with their own happiness, and that of posterity, to a short temporary indulgence of sloth and idleness.

To what purpose are all the powers of rhetoric * and argument so often employed against the expence, and great danger of a mercenary army, if a better means of public defence is not proposed, nor substituted in its room? For a defence against external force there must be of some
fort

* Ad summam rerum nostrarum pertinere arbitror, ut cogitatis magis, quid agendum nobis, quam quid loquendum sit. Liv.

fort or other. Perhaps the difficulty of contriving a commodious militia-scheme for a government so extensive as ours, or the dryness of a subject incapable of yielding pleasure to the imagination, or rather the repugnancy of it to the private interest, and sinister views of statesmen and foldiers, who are best qualified to plan it, hath hitherto prevented the undertaking : if therefore many defects appear in this now submitted to public consideration, the author believes himself excusable, and will think his labour amply recompenced, if it excites a more skilful hand to correct his errors, or to communicate a more perfect plan ; such as may induce
his

his Majesty and the Parliament to establish by law a national and well-disciplined militia, by which the honour of the crown may be exalted to the highest degree of splendor, and the freedom, safety, and happiness of this nation secured absolutely against all the attempts of its most envious or ambitious neighbours.

A

A
P L A N
FOR A
National Militia
IN
GREAT-BRITAIN, &c.

P A R T I.

IN the idea of a national militia I comprehend the military service of all men capable of bearing arms, from the age of 18 to that of 50 years; except such as may be exempted by law; suppose all members of both houses, during the sessions of parliament; the king's most honourable privy council; all the judges, officers of the household, treasury, exchequer, admiralty, and navy board; all counsel-
B lers

Part I. lars at law, follicitors, and attorneys, during the terms or affizes ; all justices of the peace, and other peace-officers, during their grand and petty fessions, and the time of the refpective county-affizes ; all phyficians, and the whole body of the clergy.

IN a right institution of this kind no military tyranny ought to be practifed ; nor need any man be obliged to more than a few hours exercife between the rifing and fetting of the fun once a month : no corporal punifhment fhould be inflicted, but all military difcipline encouraged by example and rewards, or inforced by pecuniary fines.

IT is equally neceffary to obviate all oppreffions whatfoever. Therefore thofe who are incapacitated by bodily infirmity, tho' within the military age, ought to be excufed upon due proof made thereof before the military officers of the diftrict where fuch perfons are refident.

fidest. However, in regard to all those, Part I.
who on account of their religious prin-
ciples are not safely to be trusted with
arms, (as papists under a protestant go-
vernment,) likewise all such, who (as
the quakers) scruple, on account of
conscience, the use of arms, it is rea-
sonable they should pay such an addi-
tional tax, as may be a just equivalent
for their personal service. Again, the
poorest sort of people, who subsist by
daily labour, may be exercised for an
hour or two, after the example of the
Swiss, on sundays only, before or after
divine service at their respective parish
churches, by quarter parts each sunday.

NOR let this be judged by the over-
righteous a profanation of the day set
apart for religious purposes; since self-
preservation is the first law of God,
given as well for the defence of nations,
as of each individual, and not to be ex-
ercised any other way so effectually, as
by military discipline. Is not this exer-

Part I.  cise as innocent as any of those amusements generally permitted on the sabbath, much more conducive to the publick good, and to the preservation of the protestant religion, against the open assaults of popery? Perhaps a better means cannot be devised to frustrate even the secret machinations of jesuitical missionaries in the work of conversion, than by making it the duty of all the common people to attend the publick worship on sundays, when they may be instructed both in the true principles of the protestant religion, and in the arts of discipline, by which only it can be defended against a powerful, bigotted adversary.

UPON these principles is formed the following plan, which is submitted to the consideration, correction, and improvement of every Briton better versed in the military art.

S E C T.

NATIONAL MILITIA.

5

Sect. I.

S E C T. I.

Prop. 1. *That all the men of Great Britain, from 18 to 50 years old, capable of bearing arms, (not exempted by law, or disqualified) be form'd into a regular and well-disciplin'd militia; and that the militia of each county be establish'd as the army of that county, never to march out of its limits, except to the aid of some neighbour county, and the king in person, or by his sign manual to the lord lieutenant, shall so appoint.*

THUS all being enjoined the like service, no one can complain of partiality, and these limitations at once secure the people from being harass'd and fatigued by unnecessary marches, and the crown from all attempts of insurrection, or disquiet from the ambition of the most factious leaders. Indeed, where all are arm'd, every mover of riot and ground-

Part I.  less disturbance must soon meet his just reward, since the majority of men desire peace and order; and, whenever they have power, will exert their joint endeavours to preserve it.

S E C T. II.

Prop. 2. *That the militia of each county be divided into two branches, viz. the superior militia composed altogether of men of property, and the subordinate militia of the common people.*

THIS arrangement of the militia into distinct classes, is a further security to the king and people, and a more effectual defence of both: for, as the superior militia are men of property, who will naturally fight most vigorously in defence of it, so it is intended by this plan, that they should be the only soldiers form'd into battalions, and intrusted with their own arms, because less prone to insurrection, and any tumultuous

multuous disturbance, which may render Sect. 3. that property precarious. On the contrary, such men are ever most ready and willing, for their own sake, to suppress the tumults, which are sometimes fomented in a free government, by men of desperate fortune among the rabble.

S E C T. III.

Prop. 3. *That the superior militia be divided into two branches, cavalry and infantry.*

THIS subdivision is necessary under the present management of war: for a numerous cavalry is the most proper defence of an open country, where, by quick movements, it may harass and distress an enemy every step of their march. Upon this circumstance, perhaps, the late duke of Marlborough founded his opinion, (if the tradition of his saying so is true) that the security of England consisted in the multitude of its horsemen.

S E C T. IV.

Prop. 4. *That the cavalry of superior militia be form'd out of the nobility and gentry, at their own expence, and be called the light-horse, well train'd in both exercises of horse and foot. Every man, not exempted by law, shall roll in this cavalry, who is worth 6000 l. in money, or possessed of 300 l. per annum, or upwards, in fee simple, copy-hold, lease-hold, or estate for life in some part of the British dominions. Each troop is to chuse its own officers annually by ballot; and those officers, when incorporated into regiments of the hundreds, are to chuse their respective field-officers by ballot: The king still retaining the power of appointing general officers annually out of all the field-officers so chosen, both of horse and foot. The younger sons and brothers of all persons so qualified, when of age to bear arms, are permitted to*
roll

roll with their fathers or brothers of Sect. 4. the superior cavalry, provided they are as well mounted and accouter'd in the same uniform: but if not in-rolled there, all such are obliged to list in the infantry of the superior militia, by virtue of their fathers or brothers qualifications, and to do duty accordingly.

By this proposition the nobility and gentry of the best fortunes are form'd into a body of light-horse in each county, as well for their own ease in accoutrements, as for the safety of the kingdom; since by that means they can with more expedition march to the enemy at landing, and encounter them either as horse or foot, as may be most advantageous.

THAT a well-constituted militia should chuse their own officers up to the rank of generals, is highly reasonable, because the choice will naturally fall upon men of the best character, from whom there is no fear of injustice, or military oppression :

Part I.  oppreffion : and as the ballot prevents all resentments, fo the choice for one year only, will keep all officers within the bounds of moderation and decorum in the exercife of military power : nor can the honour of the crown fuffer any diminution, while his majesty retains the fole power of appointing generals over each county, out of the field-officers chosen by the body of officers, who are the beft judges of their neighbours characters, and will therefore elect the ableft men in point of morals, education, and fortune.

THUS the rights of the crown, and the liberty of the people may be preferv'd in perfect fafety ; and what can give more fpirit and martial vigour to an army of gentlemen, than to be led by thofe of whom they have the beft opinion ?

To form a militia of light cavalry out of the nobility and gentry, each being worth 300 l. per annum and upwards,
or

or 6000*l.* in money, at their own charge, can be no increase of expence to people of that rank ; because all such keep horses for health, convenience, or equipage, which, with a little attention to size and colour, may answer all military purposes : and I appeal to the sense of every gentleman, whether some part of the expence at present bestowed on hounds and race-horses may not be apply'd more to the publick advantage in the military way, and be at the same time a more manly, graceful exercise. Sect. 4.

CUSTOM, which has given a sanction to such profitless amusements, attended with immense expence, will, upon the establishment of a national militia, soon justify a more commendable employment. A military spirit will then actuate every gentleman to rival his neighbour in the accomplishments of a good officer, especially if those of the highest rank and character will set the example with steadiness and vigour.

BUT

Part I.

BUT as the notion of order is generally annexed to uniformity of dress, accoutrements, and colour of horses ; I would recommend a plain scarlet dress with gilt buttons, a gold laced hat, and light boots, for the habit of the superior cavalry ; for the accoutrements, such saddles as our horse-officers now use, with plain scarlet furniture ; a light carbine and pistols of musquet bore ; the horses of 15 hands high, like our strong sized hunters, and of a bay colour, as the most common and most easily collected.

THIS similitude may perhaps be thought unnecessary, as it is only an imitation of the present custom of the soldiery in a point not essential. But as this uniformity of dress is the general practice of the armies of Europe, it is a circumstance, that deserves consideration ; for we know what effects fashion and opinion, however arbitrary, have
upon

upon men. Their enemies will proba- Sect. 4.
bly entertain higher notions of such an }
army, and their friends receive more
pleasure from the appearance. There-
fore as the uniformity of dress and ac-
coutrements is not more expensive than
the contrary, I would recommend it as
a positive injunction in the act of mili-
tia; but more especially in the arms of
horse and foot, because if all are not
exactly of the same bore *, the car-
tridges

* It may not be improper here to correct an error in common practice, even among our regular forces, viz. that of making cartridges with too heavy a load of powder, which do less execution, and hurt our soldiers by the recoil of their arms. To remedy this defect therefore it is proposed, that exact care be taken to fill all cartridges with no more powder than is sufficient to give the ball good force without recoil in the explosion, which I apprehend may be done with one fourth part of the weight of ball, if the powder is good. In like manner, the nicest care ought to be taken in casting bullets so much less than the bore, that they may slip down with ease, when rolled in cartridges, even into a foul gun: for, if both these regulations are not observ'd with accuracy, fatal defeats may happen to armies in the heat of action, by a great number of men and arms becoming absolutely useless.

Part I. bridges provided by the publick must be
 { useless to a great part of the army.

S E C T. V.

Prop. 5. *That the infantry of the superior militia be also form'd of men of property, at their own expence; viz. all men worth 50 l. per annum, or upwards, (but under 300 l. per annum) of any kind of estate in the British dominions: all such as are worth in money or chattels five hundred pounds; all those who rent an house or lands to the value of 50 l. per annum, or upwards, to 300 l. The sons also of all men thus qualified, when of age to bear arms, are entitled to list in the infantry of the superior militia, if they think fit to comply with the uniform; but if not, they are obliged to do duty in the subordinate militia of the parish where they reside. Every company of the superior militia is to chuse its own officers*

cers by ballot, and when form'd Sect. 5.
into a regiment of the hundred,
those officers to chuse the field-officers
out of their own corps by ballot.
The king appoints general officers
annually over the foot, in like man-
ner, as before specified in the ge-
nerals of the horse. No distinction
to be made in the dress of officers,
except the scarf or sash, but all to
wear the same uniform established
by act of parliament for horse or
foot.

THE reasons offer'd in support of the first proposition, are in general applicable to this. Little therefore need be added here, but with respect to the uniform of dress and accoutrements. In the former case, I would recommend only a plain blue cloath coat trim'd with gilt buttons, an hat laced with a gold lace of an inch broad, and white linen gaiters. As to arms and accoutrements, better cannot be desired than those now in the hands

Part I. hands of our regular foot soldiers, either
 { for size or use : and therefore it is to be
 wished, that all the arms for the national
 militia were deliver'd from the tower of
 the same bore, and the weapons of the
 same size ; that every man entitled to
 roll in the horse or foot of the superior
 militia, may be obliged to provide him-
 self from thence, at a certain moderate
 price, and of real goodness.

To admit no distinction of dress be-
 tween the officers and soldiers of the mi-
 litia, except the scarf or sash, seems
 agreeable both to oeconomy and good
 policy ; for by that means all officers
 may save the needless expence of gaudy
 clothes, and be more secure in the day
 of battle, when the enemy cannot di-
 stinguish them at a distance from other
 men of the corps.

S E C T. VI.

Prop. 6. *That the cavalry of the subor-
 dinate militia be composed wholly
 of*

*of noblemen's and gentlemen's servants, or petty tenants not qualified to roll in the horse or foot of the superior militia. All these to be well mounted, arm'd, and accouter'd, as our regular horse now are, but in uniform blue, faced with red, and trim'd with white metal buttons. The subordinate cavalry to march, exercise, and be dismissed, at the same time and place with the superior cavalry of the same district, who are always to have . . . precedence, or the post of honour. Every person worth 500*l.* per annum in any kind of estate in Great Britain, or ten thousand pounds in money, shall be obliged to furnish one able-bodied man completely mounted, arm'd, and accouter'd, to this inferior order of heavy cavalry: every man worth 1000*l.* per annum, or 20,000*l.* in money, shall furnish two such troopers, and so on in proportion to*

C

the

Sect. 6.

THE subordinate cavalry composed in the manner prescribed by this proposition, will make a very large body of heavy cavalry for every county in the kingdom, with little or no additional expence to men of such fortune as are obliged to furnish them: for, as all gentlemen of 500 l. per annum and upwards, keep servants and horses, it is easy to equip his troopers in proper livery, and mount them upon coach-horses which generally are, and always may be of a proper size, and black colour, fit for heavy cavalry. Thus an idle set of people, kept too often as the trappings of grandeur, may serve all the present purposes, and become a most useful order of soldiers, by meeting and performing in the several districts all the necessary exercises of heavy cavalry, in a distinct regiment, once every month,

upon

upon the day when their masters of the superior cavalry do the same duty. Sect. 7.

LET the landed men of Great Britain consider, besides the national advantage of such an institution, whether it is not a more graceful appearance to see a gentleman of ample fortune attended to the field of military exercise by five or six servants well mounted, arm'd and accouter'd, than to view so many drones at his heels in quest of an hare: as to pursue and hunt down an insolent, ambitious invader, is more glorious than to unkennel, or kill a fox.

S E C T. VII.

Prop. 7. *That the infantry of the subordinate militia be form'd of the common people. These, tho' established into companies under officers chosen annually by themselves out of the superior militia, in the way of ballot, and to be exercised every Sunday by quarter parts, according*

A PLAN FOR A

to the captain's appointment in each parish; yet are not to be regimented, but to act as independent companies within the limits of their respective parishes; except in case of invasion, or as pioneers to the camp of the superior militia. In such cases, these companies may be form'd into regiments by the king's order, upon the same plan with the superior militia, to whom they are always to yield precedence, or the post of honour.

SINCE few men in the kingdom, capable of bearing arms, are so very poor, as to be unable to provide a spare coat of some cheap and durable colour, in which to perform their military exercises; especially as such a coat being in use once a month only, will last many years; and whoever pleases may make his usual habit of that colour: therefore I propose, that each man of the inferior infantry be cloathed in a uniform blue or
green

green coat with white metal buttons, Sect. 7. which may serve for a Sunday, and military dress. But because people of the lowest class cannot generally spare so much money as will purchase arms and accoutrements, it is reasonable that all these should be furnished at the nation's expence.

WHEN therefore the subordinate militia is exactly enrolled into companies throughout every parish of the kingdom, and each company has chosen a captain, lieutenant and ensign out of the superior militia, the government may send to every captain for each man so enrolled, a good fire-lock, bayonet, broad-sword, pouch, belts, &c. marked with the name of the parish for which they are appointed; and the captain for the time being may pass his receipt, with a promise to keep them safe and in good order, for the use of the company.

Part I.

IN like manner each captain is to take the same kind of receipt from his successor; and during every captain's possession of the arms, each is to be allow'd an armourer to keep them clean, and in good order, at the expence of the government. Each armourer may be an experienced serjeant or corporal, allow'd full pay for that purpose, and to assist the officers in disciplining the soldiers every Sunday.

PART

PART II.

THE different branches, into which it is here proposed to divide the national militia, and in what part each member of the commonwealth is to be ranked, being thus explained; it now remains to consider, how these may be severally formed into regiments, and trained. And herein we shall endeavour to comply, as near as may be, with the regulations established by the present acts of militia.

S E C T. I.

The form of establishing the infantry of the superior militia.

I. THAT the lord lieutenant of each county be authorized and required to appoint a deputy for each hundred in his jurisdiction, who under suitable penalties shall be obliged by law to do the duties of that office for three years at least.

Part II.

2. THAT the deputy lieutenant of each hundred be authorized and required, at a certain day of the year, (suppose the first Monday after Christmas) to issue his warrants under hand and seal to the high constable of the hundred, requiring him to cause all persons resident in each parish, within his district, and qualified (as in proposition the 5th) for the infantry of the superior militia to meet on the Sunday following at their respective parish churches; and there, after morning service, to enter, or enroll their names in a book kept for that purpose, in presence of the minister and churchwardens for the time being, under the penalty of forfeiting five pounds each. And the ministers and churchwardens, under the like forfeiture, are required to examine into, and determine the qualification of each person to be enrolled, to see his name enter'd, and to make return thereof under

der their hands within ten days, to the deputy lieutenant of the hundred, describing each person's qualifications, and annexing it to his name : and also in the same roll to make a separate column, containing the names of all persons resident in each parish, who are qualified to serve in the infantry of superior militia, and have refused or neglected to list in the same : and also the names of all papists and quakers resident in each parish, are to be distinguished in another separate column, that a due course be taken to levy fines upon delinquents, and to oblige quakers and papists to pay the legal tax appointed in lieu of personal military service. Sect. I.

3. THAT the minister and churchwardens of each parish be obliged to summon each person, when his name is enrolled at their respective churches, to appear there the Sunday following at noon, to chuse by ballot a captain, lieutenant, and ensign for the company of the

Part II. the superior infantry of that parish out
of the persons so enrolled.

4. THAT on the day so appointed the minister and church-wardens of each parish shall attend to take the votes in a ballot-box fixed for that purpose at the parish charge, in some open place of parade, near or in the church-yard, where each voter shall put in his roll of paper, inscribed with the names of such persons of the parish whom he thinks best qualified to serve as captain, lieutenant, and ensign of the company. And when all the voters have put in the person's name whom they chuse for captain, the box shall be open'd by the minister and church-wardens, in presence of the electors, and that person declared and enrolled captain, upon whom most nominations fall. In like manner the votes shall be taken for the lieutenant, and then for the ensign: and all persons so elected into military offices shall serve the

the same, under the penalty to be pre-
scribed by law. Sect. I.

5. WHEN the officers of each parish are thus chosen, their names shall be immediately prefixed to the muster-roll of the superior infantry, in the parish-book kept for that purpose, and an exact return made thereof to the deputy-lieutenant of the hundred; who shall also be obliged to enter the same into a bound book, distinguishing the company of each parish in his district, whether cavalry or infantry of the superior or subordinate militia, with the names of their respective officers prefixed to the roll of each company. And when all the companies of his district are completely enrolled, and form'd into a regiment of the hundred, with the field-officers names prefixed, the deputy-lieutenant shall make a fair copy of the muster-roll, and return it under his hand and seal to the lord lieutenant of the county for the time being, to be by him presented to his

Part II. his majesty for his appointment of general officers.

6. So soon as the company of superior infantry of each parish in his district is enrolled, the deputy-lieutenant of each hundred shall issue his warrant to the high constable, to cause all persons so enlisted, and elected officers, to meet completely arm'd, and accouter'd in the uniform required by law, on the first Monday in the following month in the morning, at a certain time and place to be by him appointed, nearest the centre of the hundred, there to chuse field-officers for the regiment of the hundred by ballot, which may be executed with ease in the following manner.

S E C T. II.

*The manner of electing field-officers
by ballot.*

THE companies of superior Infantry in each hundred being drawn up by their deputy-

puty-lieutenant into one battalion, all the Sect. 2. officers shall be commanded by him to take their posts at the front ; and beginning at the right, he shall demand of each officer his vote for a colonel to be chosen out of that corps of officers, whose name being inscribed in a paper rolled up, shall be kept in his hat till all have ballotted. Then the officers of the corps being muster'd in a circle, shall see him examine, and compute fairly on whom the most nominations do fall ; and that point being agreed, the said deputy-lieutenant shall proclaim the person so chosen colonel of the batallion for that year.

THE colonel being thus elected, shall appoint an adjutant out of his subaltern officers, and command him to take the votes in the same manner for a lieutenant-colonel, and major for that year, whose names, when elected, shall be also proclaim'd to the battalion.

ALL

Part II.



ALL the field-officers being thus chosen by ballot, they shall begin, by the colonel's command, to exercise in turns the battalion, on the first Monday in every month throughout the year, in every part of discipline, either in platoons or otherwise, in the most open and convenient part of the hundred, as the colonels of horse and foot think fit to appoint ; which shall be the place of rendezvous, or post of alarm, in all cases of emergency.

THUS the infantry of the superior militia may be established all over this kingdom, without much trouble, inconvenience, or expence : and it is first chosen in this plan ; because if men of fortune, their sons or brothers, in their respective districts are elected foot-officers, they are not obliged to any personal service in the cavalry, and may therefore save the expence of those accoutrements.

S E C T.

NATIONAL MILITIA.

31

SECT. III.

Sect. 3.

*The manner of establishing the
cavalry of the superior militia.*

THE subsequent Sunday after the infantry of superior militia have chosen their field-officers, all persons qualified for the superior cavalry, (as in proposition the 4th) are to be summoned to enroll their names, and chuse their officers in like manner.

AT the same time when gentlemen of the superior cavalry enroll their own names, the minister and church-wardens shall require them to enroll the names of those troopers, whom they are to furnish to the subordinate cavalry, in proportion to their estates or fortunes; and in case any gentleman neglects or refuses so to do, the deputy-lieutenant upon certificate thereof shall levy the fines required by law from such delinquents.

As

As this body of militia is to be light cavalry, it ought to be train'd to both exercises of horse and foot, upon the first Monday in every month, upon the same ground with the infantry of superior militia, which shall be agreed and appointed by the colonels of both corps.

S E C T. IV.

The manner of establishing the heavy cavalry of subordinate militia.

ON the same day when the superior cavalry meet to elect field-officers, the inferior cavalry shall be summon'd by the deputy-lieutenant of the hundred to meet at the same place, where, after the election of the superior cavalry is ended, the subordinate cavalry shall proceed to the choice of a captain, lieutenant, and cornet out of the superior cavalry of the same district by ballot; and the officers so chosen shall immediately elect by ballot field-officers out of their
own

own corps; and then, being drawn up into a distinct battalion, shall perform all the necessary exercise of heavy horse, on the first Monday in every month, at the same place where the superior cavalry perform their exercise: and, as the superior militia has always precedence, or the post of honour, so the officers of the superior militia always command those of the inferior, when in camp, or form'd into an army. Sect. 5.

S E C T. V.

The manner of establishing the infantry of subordinate militia.

THE infantry of the subordinate militia, composed of the common people in every parish of the kingdom, may be next enrolled, and established into companies, under the same privilege of chusing by ballot a captain, lieutenant, and ensign, for each company, out of the superior infantry; provided their choice falls upon such as have not been

D elected

Part II. elected officers before. These, as above
 limited, are not to be regimented, nor to meet any where but at church every Sunday, to perform the manual and evolutions, with three fires executed in the quickest manner : for, as to charge and fire with expedition and dexterity, is the great aim of discipline ; it ought to be used constantly, either in platoons or otherwise, by all the orders of militia, as well as by the subordinate infantry. In like manner, the constant practice of all the evolutions will render the national militia expert at forming into every shape necessary to repel, or charge an enemy with advantage.

BUT because some few parishes in the kingdom are not populous enough to furnish a company sufficient to perform those exercises in a proper manner, the deputy-lieutenant of each hundred may, in such case, be impower'd to join those parishes together, or to a neighbouring parish of greater extent, so as to form a
company

company numerous enough for all the purposes of discipline. Sect. 6.

S E C T. VI.

Of the exercise of the militia, and expediency of annual camps successively in every county.

THE manner of performing the exercises above-mention'd is so well known, and has been so long established, as to render a precise detail unnecessary : but it is a point worthy of consideration, whether the manual exercise may not be so useful, tho' much shorter than at present ; and whether, when a battalion is form'd three deep to give several fires, it is not most convenient, according to Colonel Blakeney's regulation, for the front rank to charge their firelocks in the same posture of kneeling. But whatever forms of discipline may be established, certainly the same ought to be observ'd universally throughout the whole national militia ; that in case of

D 2

invasion,

Part II.  invasión, when the militia of several counties is join'd into one army, the whole may act with greater force, by an exact uniformity of discipline.

SINCE the art of a foldier is generally taught in a very fhort fpace to the moft aukward countrymen taken from the plow, it cannot be doubted that men of better education may become accomplished foldiers in much lefs time : and therefore it is no improbable conclufion, that the whole body of fuperior militia may, by exercifing once every month, become a regular army in one year after institution, or much fooner ; if, by more frequent exercife, the national defence requires it.

BUT, that the Britifh militia may arrive at the higheft perfection in the art of war, it feems expedient, that the army of each county fhould encamp alternately, for a week or ten days every fummer, in fome place the moft open,
and

and neareſt the ſea ; or in the centre of Sect. 6.
each county, according to its ſituation, 
near, or at a diſtance from the coaſts,
where all the diſcipline of a camp may
be learn'd ; battles, ſkirmiſhes, ſieges,
and every ſcene of war acted, as much
to the real improvement, as entertain-
ment of the army.

FOR this purpoſe, all officers and ſol-
diers, entitled to roll in the ſuperior mi-
litia of horſe, or foot, muſt be obliged
by law to furniſh themſelves with tents
and field-equipages, ſuch as the legiſla-
ture thinks fit ; the expence of which
may be made eaſy, by four or ſix neigh-
bours joining in the property of one
tent, &c.

THOSE gentlemen of fortune, who
are to furniſh the heavy cavalry, may
alſo bear the expence of their tents and
field-equipages ; for it ſeems neceſſary
that this body of horſe ſhould know all
the duties of a camp, during the conti-

Part II. nuance of which each county must furnish its own army with ammunition, provision and forage, by a county-rate, called ammunition and trophy tax, to be levied by the deputy-lieutenants of each county, or any fix of them, authorized by the militia act so to do, in a manner most equal and proportionate, according to the present forms of county-rates. And, to render the army of each county more complete, it is necessary to establish a regiment of pioneers of unmarried men, out of the subordinate infantry of that town or hundred where the alarm-post is appointed; which being incorporated, may chuse its own officers by ballot out of the superior infantry, in the manner before prescribed. This regiment of pioneers may be allow'd a pay of six-pence a day for each man, out of the same fund: for, as that order of people can support themselves by daily labour only, it seems just to allow them a small pay during the encampment.

To

To render the national militia more formidable, it is also necessary, that the army of each maritime county be provided with a good train of artillery at the national expence, to be reserv'd in an house near the magazine of ammunition, to be built for these purposes in the most convenient part of the county, as near as possible to the alarm-post; which ought to be appointed at some considerable town, where the men may be well accommodated, as near the sea-coasts as possible, and populous enough to furnish a large artillery-company, who, besides the common exercise of the firelock, may be taught all the arts of engineering, by firing cannon and mortars at butts erected for that purpose. As there is no branch of the art of war more necessary for national defence, so none ought to be more encouraged; and yet I am sorry to say it, nothing is here more neglected.

Part II.

SUCH a train of artillery may consist of 4 mortars and 20 * field-pieces, like those now in use among the Germans ; which are of less expence, and of more service than heavy cannon, because more easily drawn from place to place, as sudden occasion may require.

S E C T. VII.

Proposal for incorporating the officers of our present army, with the national militia ; and to continue them in full pay for life.

FOR the better disciplining the national militia, and at the same time to do justice to the officers of our army upon the present establishment, it seems
right

* This kind of artillery is much improved by Mr. Robins the mathematician, by decreasing the weight, and increasing the bore, so as to discharge a larger ball, or more partridge-shot in proportion, than those now in use : these field-pieces, being open at the breech at the time of loading, are less subject to heat by repeated discharges, and charged with more expedition.

right to incorporate them with the mi- Sect. 7.
litia of each district, where their general
residence is, and to continue them in full
pay during life, but without successors :
since all that expence to the publick may
be saved by the establishment of a well-
regulated militia.

As these officers are supposed masters of discipline, it is just they should take post in precedence of all militia officers of the same rank : thus generals of the present army take post of those appointed by the King out of the militia : so a colonel takes the right of him who is elected colonel of the regiment of the hundred ; the lieutenant-colonel of his fellow, the major of his, and the captain of his : for, a first and second officer of the same rank, and in the same corps, consist as well together in the land as sea-service ; and a subordination may be preserv'd, as well in the same rank, as in different orders, provided the officer,

Part II. cer, who takes post to the right of his fellow, has also the command of him.

BUT because the national militia of this kingdom will consist of more regiments than our present army, it is proposed that one officer only in pay shall be enrolled in each regiment of the militia by the king's allotment; and that all subalterns now upon the establishment shall be continued in full pay, and be posted by the king's appointment in different parishes, as far as their present number extends, to instruct the infantry of subordinate militia of each parish in the art of discipline.

IN like manner all the serjeants and corporals now in pay may be continued, and cantoned as far as their number extends, one in every hundred, to assist the officers of superior militia in teaching the military exercise.

S E C T.

S E C T. VIII.

Sect. 8.

Proposal for incorporating all officers of the navy with the militia of the district where their general residence is.

THE navy of Great Britain is without all doubt its present bulwark against foreign invasion, and will always be the only protection of its navigation and commerce: Therefore it is good policy to give all possible encouragement to sea-officers, by continuing them in constant full pay, provided they are also incorporated with the militia of the district where their general residence is, upon the same foot with the land-officers above-mentioned; computing the precedence of rank among them according to priority of commission; as the precedence of militia-officers must be computed from the first election, a certificate whereof may be always given by the deputy-lieutenant of the hundred, where each officer is first elected.

Part II.



THIS institution of incorporating all sea-officers with the national militia, is probably the best means of advancing the interest and glory of this kingdom ; because, by learning the military art, they may become as well qualified to conduct armies, as fleets.

IT has been the misfortune of this nation, in the first institution, to separate absolutely the sea and land service ; so that there is hardly a single instance of one accomplished in both. The ill success of all our expeditions, where land and sea forces in conjunction were necessary, has been owing principally to that cause ; but when our sea-officers are as well qualified by military discipline for both spheres, we may expect to succeed in such enterprizes, at least as well as the French ; for whatever may be presumed in favour of land-officers, it is certainly more easy to learn their art, than that of a sea-commander :
nor

nor is it a groundless speculation, to be- Sect. 8.
lieve that those who have often com-
bated the dangers of the sea, and been
long inured to fatigue, are best able
to bear the toils and hazards of a camp.
Upon all accounts therefore it is most
expedient that the British sea-officers
should be train'd and well skilled in the
art of war practised at land; as, by the
help of a more liberal education than is
consistent with the present rules of ser-
vitude in the navy, they may be quali-
fied to command both land and sea
forces, upon any foreign expedition,
without the fatal interruptions attending
a joint, or incompatible command. For
though the skill required in a sea com-
mander is of a more extensive kind than
the mere science of discipline at land;
yet certainly it cannot be necessary for
attaining it, to send a young gentleman
on board, at the age of 15, a compa-
nion for foremast-men, and secluded
from all means of a liberal education.
The greatest sea-commander this nation
can

Part II. can boast of (Blake) was educated at Oxford as a scholar, and from thence became a land-foldier, before he apply'd himself to the sea. Might not our navy therefore be conducted by men of greater accomplishments, if those of education, instructed in all the previous knowledge requisite, might be admitted as officers, after two years service ?

S E C T. IX.

The manner of enforcing discipline in a national militia.

WE are often told by modern soldiers, that military discipline cannot be well established without the utmost severities of corporal punishment, to which I confess no freeman ought to submit : for whenever societies constantly subject themselves to the lashes of martial law, they become real slaves ; and, in this sense, all the mercenary armies of the world are no better than slaves to the
will

will and power of him who pays and directs them. Sect. 9.

THESE methods of establishing military discipline are justly detestable to free-born Britons, and not less foreign to the intention of this plan, which proposes all the encouragements of example, emulation, and reward; and no other punishment but pecuniary fines, with the penalty usual in case of non-payment: for these, and these only, are the means of enforcing military discipline, consistently with publick liberty.

As the example of the great has such powerful influence over all nations in things indifferent, or perhaps criminal, and contradictory to reason; how efficaciously must it operate in cases where publick happiness is the obvious result? National honour, self-preservation, the security of property against ambitious invaders, all conspire with united force to engage great men to promote discipline in the militia by their own example.

Part II. ample. And if men of quality and fortune once take delight in martial exercises, they must very soon become honourable, and the general fashion. The crouds of fair spectators, who now attend horse-races, to see the contests of those animals in fleetness, must receive higher and more rational entertainment, from the pomp of war, and the competition of gentlemen in the arts of discipline, so evidently conducive to the publick felicity. Shews of that kind, besides the present pleasure of vision, arising from order and magnificence under the conduct of valour, fill the mind with pleasing reflections on the present publick safety, and the future stability of national prosperity. Industry itself cannot blame the loss of time spent in exercises so necessary, provided they do not interfere with the labours of harvest.

BUT lest the power of example may not prevail, let all the incentives of emulation,

lation, and even pecuniary rewards Sect. 10.
 be added to inforce a regular military discipline: A distinguishing cockade, or
 some such trophy, may excite many to
 a rivalry; as a medal, or piece of money given to the man in each company,
 who shoots best at a target, or exercises
 with most dexterity, may be more acceptable to others, than rewards merely
 honorary.

S E C T. X.

*The manner of enforcing discipline by
 fines.*

BUT as neither example, honorary,
 nor pecuniary rewards, can prevail upon
 low and sordid dispositions, abandon'd
 to sloth and indolence, it is very reasonable,
 they should pay a fine for every neglect
 of military duty, the rates of which are
 proposed in the following table, with
 entire submission to better judgment.

 A TABLE of MILITARY FINES.

*The Fines of all officers refusing
to accept militia offices into
which they are elected.*

THE deputy-lieutenant of each hundred, appointed by the lord-lieutenant's commis- sion, refusing to act, forfeits l.	50	0	0
All field-officers elected,	20	0	0
All captains elected,	10	0	0
All subaltern officers elected,	5	0	0
The treasurer of each hundred, elected by the court martial thereof,	20	0	0
The secretary, or register of the court martial and court of honour, elected,	5	0	0

The

NATIONAL MILITIA.

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*The Fines of officers for neglects
of duty, when in office.*

THE deputy-lieutenant, for
every neglect of duty prescribed
by act of parliament, forfeits 1. 5 0 0

The field-officers, for absence
on the days of exercise, neg-
lects of holding monthly
courts martial, or courts of
honour, and for every other
neglect of duty prescribed by
act of parliament, 3 3 0

Captains for the like defaults, 2 2 0

Subalterns for the like defaults, 1 1 0

The treasurer of the hundred,
for every default, 1 1 0

Secretary of the court martial,
or court of honour, for every
default, 0 10 6

Part II.

Fines of all private soldiers of the superior and subordinate militia, who refuse to enroll their names in their respective parish muster-roll at the time appointed by the deputy-lieutenant.

EACH private trooper, qualified to roll in the superior cavalry,

l. 10 0 0

Each of the superior infantry,

5 0 0

Each of the subordinate infantry,

0 10 0

All persons required by the militia to furnish troopers to the subordinate cavalry, in proportion to their fortunes, who neglect to enroll the names of such troopers in every muster-roll of the parish where their chief residence is, shall forfeit yearly,

for

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for each trooper wanting of Sect. 10.
his quota, 20 0 0

The Fines of all private soldiers in the militia, for defaults in attending exercise, keeping their arms in good order, complying with the uniform, and for all other neglects of military duty required by law.

THE private troopers of the superior cavalry, for each default forfeits l. 2 2 0
The private soldiers of the superior infantry, 1 1 0
The private soldiers of the subordinate cavalry, 0 5 0
The private soldiers of the subordinate infantry, 0 2 6

Part II.

*The Fines of peace-officers, for
neglects of duty prescribed by
the act of militia.*

MINISTERS and church- wardens, for each default	1. 5	0	0
The high constable of each hundred,	5	0	0
The petty constable and tything- men of each parish,	1	0	0

*The annual tax of quakers and
papists, in lieu of personal
service.*

THOSE qualified by fortune to roll in the superior infantry, per annum,	1. 12	12	0
Those qualified for the superior cavalry, per annum,	25	4	0
Those for the subordinate in- fantry, per annum,	1	10	0
		Those	

Those qualified by estate to furnish troopers to the subordinate cavalry are to do so, or pay the same fines required by law from all other delinquents of the like kind, and in the same proportion.

ALL fines are first demandable by the treasurer of the hundred, by virtue of an order from the court martial; but, in case of refusal, he returns the list, with a certificate thereon, to the court martial, which certifies the same to the deputy-lieutenant of the hundred, who thereupon issues his warrants of distress: and, after recovering the said fines, deducts 5 l. per cent. for his trouble, and pays the remainder to the treasurer of the hundred, who is also to be allowed 5 l. per cent. for all money issued by him, according to order, or by virtue of his office,

Part II.



ALL officers ; and, if required, all foldiers of the superior and subordinate militia, shall take the oaths of allegiance and supremacy, when tender'd by the deputy-lieutenant of each hundred ; or, in case of refusal, pay the same tax required by law from papists, and to be disqualified from bearing arms in the militia.

S E C T. XI.

The manner of levying fines upon all delinquents in military duty.

IF any man qualified to serve in either order of the militia, shall refuse or neglect to enroll, or do military duty according to act of parliament after enlisting, he is justly fineable. But yet that fine ought to be levied in a manner the least inconvenient. Therefore at the first meeting of the militia, after the election of field-officers, an exact enquiry shall be made by all the officers

of every corps, (who are to be consti- Sect. II.
tuted the court martial of each hundred) }
into delinquents of all sorts, a list of
whom shall be drawn out, distinguishing
the respective parishes of their residence,
and a certificate thereof annexed, and
return'd under the hands of any three
officers of each regiment, (one of which
must be a field-officer) to the deputy-
lieutenant of the respective hundred,
who, being authorized by law, shall is-
sue his warrants to levy the legal fine
upon each delinquent, according to the
nature of the offence.

AND this manner of proceeding is to
be observ'd with respect to the whole
superior militia of horse and foot, the
deputy-lieutenant being always obliged
to specify in his warrant, the offence,
the offender's name, and the sum to be
levied by the constable, or tything-man
of each tything, upon the goods and
chattels of each delinquent; to sell the
same at publick outcry in six days after
the

Part II. the levy is made, paying the fine to the
deputy-lieutenant of the hundred; and, after deducting one shilling in the pound for his trouble, the surplus must be return'd to the owner, or proprietor of the goods levied on.

IN like manner all fines are to be levied on the goods and chattels of delinquents in the subordinate militia, by virtue of the deputy-lieutenant's warrant, grounded upon the joint certificate of the captain, lieutenant, and ensign of each company; but in case no goods nor chattels can be found, then the delinquent is to be committed to the common goal of the county, by warrant under the hands and seals of the deputy-lieutenant, and the commanding officer of the corps, whereof the delinquent is a member, for such time as the act of militia shall prescribe. And all the fines of the superior and subordinate militia return'd to the deputy-lieutenant of the hundred, are by him to be paid over
to

to the treasurer of the hundred for Sect. II. the time being, who is to be chosen by the officers of superior militia, horse and foot, by ballot, at the first day of exercise after their own election of officers is over. And the said treasurer of the hundred so chosen, shall accept, and do the duty of that office, for three years, under the penalty prescribed by law, to be levied by distress, and sale of his goods, by virtue of the deputy-lieutenant's warrant as aforesaid; which forfeiture shall be paid to the succeeding treasurer of the hundred.

BUT, as the treasurer of each hundred is subject to some trouble in the execution of his office, he ought therefore in reason to be exempted from all other unprofitable offices, civil or military, by express words in the act of militia.

FOR the same reason the deputy-lieutenant of each hundred ought to be excused from all other unprofitable offices,
civil

Part II. civil or military ; and the fine to which each deputy is subject for neglecting or refusing his office, may be levied upon his goods and chattels, by virtue of a warrant under the hand and seal of the lord-lieutenant of the county, directed to the high sheriff, or his deputy ; which fine is to be returned to the treasurer of the hundred where it is levied, for the use of the militia.

THE treasurer of each hundred shall not issue, or pay any sum of money, but by a written order, under the hands of the president, and two other members of the court martial of each hundred ; except for powder, bullets, and the expence of making cartridges, of which an ample store is to be provided at the discretion of the treasurer, in the magazine of the hundred, to be built for that purpose, in the most convenient place, by the joint direction of the colonels, or commanding officers of the superior militia of horse and foot, with the consent
and

and concurrence of the deputy-lieutenant Sect. II.
and treasurer of the hundred for the time 
being.

BUT in case the deputy-lieutenant, the treasurer of the hundred, or any other officer employ'd to levy fines, shall oppress, or treat unjustly any man; imbezzle, or misapply any money; such person so offending may be indicted by any officer of the hundred, at the next quarter-sessions, and fined at the discretion of the justices: and, upon the certificate returned by the justices of the quarter-sessions to the court of exchequer, process may issue from thence to recover all sums of money imbezzled, in the same manner by extent, or otherwise, as is usual to recover the king's debts: which sums of money, so receiv'd, must be paid over to the treasurer of that hundred, to which it properly appertains, whose receipt shall be an absolute discharge for all money paid to him by any person whatsoever.

S E C T.

S E C T. XII.

*The establishment of a court martial, and
court of honour in each hundred.*

As it is impossible to provide for every minute occurrence that may happen in establishing and governing the militia, it seems necessary to erect a court martial, consisting of the two corps of officers, horse and foot, of the superior militia in each hundred, (subalterns excepted) with power to make regulations conformable to the general intention of the militia act ; the majority of which officers (exclusive of subalterns) shall constitute a court martial of the hundred to all intents and purposes, as if all were present. The lord-lieutenant, deputy-lieutenant, and all generals of the county are always to be esteem'd members of the court martial of every hundred, and may preside there according to rank, whenever they attend: for, the commanding officer present, of whatever rank,

rank, is to preside in each court martial: and the person chosen out of the subaltern officers, by a majority of voices of the court martial, shall act as the register and secretary thereof, under the penalty prescribed by law. Sect. 12.

IF, when a military spirit becomes general, it shall be suspected, that the sentiment of honour may run so high, as to increase among gentlemen the detestable practice of private vengeance by duel; and, if it be thought necessary for preventing this evil, the court martial may also be instituted a court of honour, with full power to adjudge, and finally determine all disputes about precedence, affront, or otherwise, for the preservation of peace, order, and discipline; but such a court need not be furnished with any further power to enforce its decrees, than that of degrading from their military rank, whoever shall refuse conformity to its decisions.



THE jurisdiction of this court may extend to officers of all degrees, both in the superior and subordinate militia, general officers excepted, who are to be tried only by their peers, in a court of honour to be appointed by the king. But the court of honour of each hundred, (which is also a court martial of the same district) must have power to examine, and pass annually the treasurer's accounts, who shall be absolutely exonerated from all subsequent demands, upon accounts so passed, under the hands of the persons then constituting that court.

S E C T. XIII.

A tax upon all papists, by way of equivalent for personal service in the militia, is just and reasonable.

THO' it is probable that there are many good and faithful subjects among the papists of this kingdom, who would
not

not change their liberty, nor render Sect. 13. their property precarious, by introducing tyranny, with their religion, into this country; yet, since those cannot be distinguished, by any certain criterion, from bigots of the Romish persuasion; and, since none of that sect can, consistently with their avowed principles, give this government such testimonials of their allegiance as are required by its constitution, it is highly just and reasonable not to trust them with arms, as it is to oblige them to pay a tax in lieu of personal service: for, as every member of society owes that service to the defence of the government from whence he derives protection and security; so he that yields it not, when able, either thro' indolence, or by adopting principles subversive of the constitution, wilfully withholds his service; and therefore ought to pay a tax equivalent to the fines which every other subject pays for neglect of military duty, in proportion to his fortune and condition in life.

F

S E C T.

The reasonableness of levying the like tax upon quakers, who refuse to contribute personal service to the defence of their country.

QUAKERS in general are a peaceable, frugal, industrious people, and upon these accounts valuable members of society: but, by holding obstinately the principle of non-resistance, they resign every social blessing to the first bold invader, and even invite publick destruction. In this respect the quakers and papists are alike injurious to society; for if a government is ruined, it matters not by what hands, whether by foreigners unresisted, or by subjects ill affected. The papists therefore, who cannot be trusted with arms in a protestant government; and the quakers, who scruple to use them, notwithstanding the primary law of self-preservation, ought in justice to contribute a tax equivalent

to the personal service of other subjects, Sect. 15.
 in proportion to their fortune and condition, as all others must do, who willingly withhold their personal aid from the publick defence.

S E C T. XV.

The application of all fines to military use.

1. IT hath been said before, that the treasurer of every hundred may ex officio furnish the magazine with powder and balls sufficient for the whole militia of his district; some part of the fines may be therefore apply'd principally to that purpose, after the militia has been established.

2. THESE fines may also be applied to the purchase of habiliments for the whole militia, superior and subordinate; such as half-pikes, partizans, halberts, standards, kettle-drums, trumpets, drums, and colours, for every company in the hundred, which may be distinguished from each other by diversification of

F 2 colours,

Part II. colours, or devices, which are descriptive of the parish to which they belong. In the mean while, cockades of different colours may be provided for the subordinate militia, horse and foot, suitable to their ensigns, by which each regiment of the county, and each company of subordinate foot may be distinguished from others.

THAT all these should be provided out of the fund arising from fines, and the tax of papists and quakers, seems reasonable, because, by the annual election of officers, frequent * rotations will happen, and all these instruments and ensigns of war may be kept ready for the use of each regiment and company, without

* The rotation of military offices may be objected to, as contrary to modern practice ; but the wonderful success of the Roman armies proves it absolutely right. The Romans, without doubt, affected glory and command as much as other people, but yet they disdained not to obey in their armies the same persons whom they had formerly commanded ; and to serve as private soldiers, where they had been formerly generals.

without putting the officers to a new Sect. 15.
expence upon every change of station. }

3. OUT of the same fund the charge of beacons may be supplied, and these fixed by appointment of the deputy-lieutenant, and treasurer of each hundred, upon the highest hill, or most conspicuous place of each district, by which the alarm may be soon conveyed round the whole kingdom.

IN Switzerland the common method of giving the alarm is by lighting an heap of straw in the day-time, or a pile of wood at night; but an empty pitch-barrel erected upon a bar of iron fasten'd to a pole, may answer all the purposes at a less expence, until the fund is sufficient to build small stone towers, and to buy two field-pieces, which may give the alarm, and be of use to the corps of each hundred, when upon action.

THE Germans are said to provide two such field-pieces for every regiment,

Part II. and it seems a fit example for us, since
 it renders a body of troops more formidable ; and, by adding these to the artillery of the county, the whole army will, upon a junction, be amply provided.

4. BUT as it will be difficult to furnish trumpeters and drummers, expert in their several arts, without hire, it may be presumed this fund will be soon sufficient to supply such, to each corps, at a moderate pay, to be settled and agreed by the court martial of each hundred, and constantly paid by the treasurer for the time being.

5. OUT of the same fund the treasurer of the hundred may provide sufficient quantities of cockades, made of silver, or gold ribband, to be conferred, as military rewards, on such men as the commanding officer of each corps shall adjudge them to ; or, if he sees fit, instead of a cockade, the person meriting may have 2s. 6d. or 5s. as he shall appoint.

appoint. Such rewards, tho' of trifling Sect. 16.
 expence, may be effectual incentives }
 to military performances among the
 common people, as emulation and love
 of their country will be to all men of
 higher rank, and better education.

S E C T. XVI.

Military regulations for the city of London, and all other populous cities in the British dominions.

THE preceding regulations calculated for the militia of the kingdom in general, may serve for the cities of London and Westminster, and all populous towns in the British dominions, except in the few instances following.

I. BESIDES the persons qualified by estate to serve in the superior cavalry, all such as reside in cities, and keep a riding horse, or chaise-horse, should be obliged to conform to the establishment of the superior cavalry, and do the duty of that station.

Part II.



2. IN like manner all persons, whose residence is in cities, and who keep a pair of coach-horses, whether qualified by estate or not, should be obliged to furnish two troopers to the inferior cavalry, mounted, arm'd and accouter'd according to the established uniform.

3. ALL house-keepers, (except such as are before exempted, and the officers of the customs and excise) in every city, with their journeymen, and apprentices of age to bear arms, should serve in the superior militia of foot in person, and comply with the uniform established by law.

4. ALL the rest of the inferior people, such as working mechanicks, porters, coachmen, carmen, &c. should be rolled in the subordinate infantry, and do duty at their respective parish-churches every Sunday, in quarter parts, in the same manner as the common people of every county.

5. BUT because cities are so populous as to furnish great numbers of men both to the superior and subordinate militia, every parish may compose a regiment of each order, with liberty to elect officers for each corps, in the manner before prescribed ; and the superior militia, with the subordinate cavalry, may perform their monthly exercises in any square, or open place of parade, nearest to their respective parishes. But as the church-yards of some parishes are too small for drawing up, or exercising the subordinate foot ; in such cases they may perform it before or after divine service, in any open place nearest their respective parish-churches, where the officers of each corps shall agree to appoint.

6. THE city of London being the great repository of the national treasure, and principal port of navigation and commerce ; the super-intendency of its militia should certainly be executed rather

Part II. ther by a joint commission, as at present, than be intrusted to a single person. Suppose then, that as this city among others, has the privilege of chusing its own sheriffs, it might also have the appointment of its lieutenancy ; so far at least as to have that commission supplied out of persons recommended to that office by a solemn election.

WHENEVER therefore an act of militia is passed, in conformity to this, or a better plan, it is to be wished that the corporation of London may be authorized and required to select annually, by a majority of votes, in the way of ballot, 24 men ; whose names being certified under the city-seal, and presented to his Majesty by the hand of the recorder, he may chuse such as he pleases to constitute a court of lieutenancy, consisting of 12 members, by whose prudence and vigilance the militia of London may become a well-disciplin'd army of 200,000 men : an army of itself numerous

merous enough, if well train'd, to ren- Sect. 16.
der our capital invincible. 

7. As this lieutenancy is to exercise all the powers with which the lords-lieutenants of counties are invested, so it is necessary this court should be authorized and required by the militia act, to appoint deputy-lieutenants for each ward of the city, subject to the same duties, and under the like penalties with all other deputy-lieutenants of the hundreds.

8. BUT as magazines of powder are dangerous to cities, it seems proper that the Tower of London should be that city's magazine, from whence the ammunition may be conveniently distributed in small portions every week, or otherwise, as occasion may require. Near all other cities it is expedient to build small fortresses for the situation and safety of their several magazines and artillery. The city of London can
want

Part II. want no other but the royal artillery
commonly lodged in the tower ; and the
hamlets may continue to furnish an ar-
tillery-company, as at present, to be
exercised in all the arts of engineering,
with more care and assiduity than hi-
therto.

9. GREAT cities are too populous
to be drawn into one camp at a mode-
rate expence, but yet it is expedient
their superior militia should be in some
measure expert in all the necessary pre-
parations for publick defence : and
therefore it is proposed, that one quarter
part of the superior militia of London
and Westminster, with the like portion
of inferior cavalry, be encamped by rota-
tion and lot, upon Black-heath for one
week, at the most leisure season of
every summer. In less populous cities
and towns, where the superior militia
exceeds not five thousand men, the
whole body of horse and foot will form
but

but a small army, and a moderate en-
campment. Sect. 16.

WITH these few variations it is presumed the preceding plan may be adapted to cities and populous towns, as well as to all the counties of this kingdom : and if the legislature approves, and puts it in execution, it is to be wished the law may extend to every part of the British dominions, where it is practicable ; more especially to our provinces, and great cities of North America, situated near a restless, enterprising neighbour, now at enmity, whose interest it is to subdue by fraud or force, all those countries lying between his dominions and the sea ; and consequently obstruct the increase of his navigation and commerce. For preventing therefore such fatal incroachments on the British dominions, no means can be so effectual as the establishment of a general militia well train'd to arms in all those provinces, where
the

Part II. the governor of each may be invested
with the same powers, which are exercised by the lords-lieutenants of counties in this kingdom.

It must be observ'd however, that this scheme is not suitable in all points to our sugar islands, Jamaica, Antigua, St. Christopher's, Montserrat, and Nevis ; because none of them are peopled with white inhabitants proportionate to their extent, and blacks are not to be trusted with arms. Those islands therefore must have the aid of some mercenary forces added to their respective militias, as well for preserving their safety within, as to guard them from petty incursions of a near and more powerful neighbour : but such a joint force is not sufficient to defend them against a general invasion, which the French will most probably attempt ; because upon the possession of those colonies, so happily situated for the protection of the whole British navigation and commerce to America, and
for

for distressing the French, depends the Sect. 16.
empire of those seas. Strong fleets there-
fore properly, and constantly stationed
at the sugar colonies, are the only infal-
lible means of preserving those most va-
luable possessions, and of reducing the
maritime power of France.

How useful, how necessary indeed a general militia is for the kingdom of Ireland, and the great city of Dublin, every man of sense there will discern at first sight, who considers how much his country is exposed to invasion, from its numerous unfortified harbours, and deep shores; and what encouragement a popish enemy has to invade a place abounding with people of the same religion, ready to favour an enterprize so conducive to their private interest, and to the extirpation of those whom they judge hereticks.

THE parliament of Ireland may probably think these points most worthy of
con-

Part II. consideration at this dangerous juncture,
 { when no doubt they will have both his Majesty's concurrence and encouragement, to institute a national militia of protestants, so necessary to their interior safety, and to the preservation of that valuable part of his dominions from exterior force.

AND if a national militia is necessary to preserve the provinces of this kingdom, how much more necessary is it to the seat of empire, which ought to have strength enough, not only for its own defence, but to protect all the distant parts of its wide extended territories; especially as they are exposed to the attacks of a great and formidable enemy? an enemy envious of our happiness, ever ready and watchful to exalt his power, and extend his commerce upon the ruin of this nation, which seems impossible to be prevented by any other means than that of a just and frugal administration, supported by a well-disciplin'd national militia.

A P P E N D I X.

INTRODUCTION

*By Major General Roy D. Keehn
President of the National Guard Association
of the United States (1934-5)*

The Purpose of This Pamphlet

THE National Guard system has been adopted by Congress, yet is generally misunderstood. That it was the original conception of George Washington and his generals at the close of the Revolutionary War, would be news to most of our citizens. That the National Guard must furnish the bulk of our war army in the first months of a national emergency, also would probably be news to all but a few well informed persons. And that it is the great bulwark of the state governments in time of civil disorders, is generally misunderstood.

The national tragedies involved in the development of the old militia into the highly organized, equipped and trained force of today, are unknown, except to those students of American history who have delved into the manuscript records of the Congressional Library in Washington. A knowledge of this phase of our history is essential to an adequate understanding of our military system today—and of its necessities.

The accompanying article, by Professor James Weber Linn, University of Chicago, epitomizes the drama and the tragedies of our past military system—or lack of system—and makes clear the sound basis on which the present National Guard of the United States is organized. It also clearly indicates the importance of intelligent support for the further and necessary development of the existing Guard organization.

* * * * *

The National Guard Association at its annual meeting in 1934, after much discussion, passed certain resolutions directing the President of the Association, and the Executive Council and Legislative Committee, to bring to the attention of the Congress and others, the urgent necessities of the Guard requiring immediate remedial action.

A digest of the more important of these resolutions appears as an appendix to this pamphlet.

We lack sufficient numbers to meet our present responsibilities. A very small increase would add immeasurably to the efficiency of the National Guard on mobilization by completing the organization of the eighteen infantry divisions, and by increasing its ability to meet civil disorders such as have recently threatened law and order in some states.

We lack seriously in allowances to maintain our men in decent uniforms, with proper equipment. A comparatively slight increase in appropriations would remedy this deficiency.

We lack the modern weapons and material with which foreign armies are provided. It must be admitted that this is a surprising situation, since we are the leaders of the world in the invention, development and manufacture of equipment of this nature. Our tank companies are about to be disbanded for lack of materiel. To send out American boys poorly equipped and supported with obsolete weapons would seem to be our present policy.

Our most serious lack is the understanding support of the average citizen, which I am sure would be accorded the National Guard were there a more general knowledge of the facts set forth in Professor Linn's brief account. I commend it to your thoughtful attention, and I appeal to you to assist us to help the nation and support the authority of the State governments.

Chicago,

ROY D. KEEHN

January 12, 1935.

NOTE: Since the above was written in 1935, largely on account of the educational campaign conducted along the lines indicated therein, The Congress has appropriated funds to increase the National Guard by 5000 each in 1934 and 1935 and has included in the budget an appropriation for an additional 5000 increase for 1937. The War Department has recommended a total increase of 20,000. Congress has also, at the urgent request of the National Guard, modified the National Defense Act in many respects, strengthening the position of the Guard as an important cog in our National Defense machine and has created "The National Guard of the United States" as a Federal force which comprises the exact personnel of the National Guard of the various States and as such is subject to call by the President on action by Congress.

Our National Guard, therefore, now constitutes the largest, important part of the first line defensive force of the United States.

November 17, 1936.

R. D. K.

Washington's Lost Plan Revived



**NATIONAL GUARD TODAY THE
PROPOSAL OF 150 YEARS AGO**



**BRITISH TROOPS
DESTROY PLAN**



Since this study was prepared in 1935 "A Plan for a National Militia in Great Britain" (1745) was presented to the Commanding General of the Illinois National Guard by and from the library of a distinguished citizen of Illinois, Colonel George Tracy Buckingham, of Chicago. This book, both in typographic format and binding, is a facsimile reproduction and has unusual historical value.

It is the hope of the Division Commander that a study of these two documents will stir your interest in, and appreciation of, the present National Guard set-up of your country.

R. D. K.

SUPPOSE war was declared between the United States and any other great power or powers—what would the President of the United States, who is the head of the military as of the civil power of the country, do?

He would call out the Guard.

There are fewer than sixty thousand Army "regulars" in the United States today. But in ten days, by the issuance of one key "emergency" order, close on to a quarter of a million members of the National Guard, trained soldiers, ably officered, with full equipment, could be brought together in any designated area of the country.

In 1917 it was necessary first to train officers to train soldiers. Today, though the body of the Army is even more of a "skeleton" than it was then, there are thousands of officers capable of taking charge of every sort of detail of organization, from the commanding of troops to the service of supply; a few of them paid, most of them unpaid, but ready. Every one of them knows just where he is supposed to go, just what he is supposed to do, in a major emergency. And every one of them knows too that the expansible, immediate line of military defense of the country in such an emergency is the National Guard. It was fifteen months before any mass of even partially trained troops were ready for mass action in 1918. Similar-sized bodies could be made ready today for mass action in less than fifteen days; and within six months the "millions" whom former Secretary of State Bryan optimistically visualized as "springing to arms" could be moulded into a truly effective nation on defense.

The Lost Plan of Washington

What, precisely, *is* the National Guard? Do you know? Not very likely. For few do know, outside of the members of the Guard itself, and Congress, and the officers of administration of the War Department and the Regular Army. And even in Congress, even extraordinary as it may seem among many members of the Guard itself, there is remarkable ignorance of its position on the national team, its precise place at the opening of the game, and particularly perhaps of its history.

And behind the present development of the National Guard there lies a strange tale of prevision and forgetfulness, one of the most dramatic examples in all military history of the folly of ignorance. It is the tale of how George Washington, assisted by the suggestions of his Generals, devised the plan for this development of the Guard, just as it is now worked out in principle; and how Washington's

plan was LOST in the archives, utterly forgotten, and unused for more than 125 years.

Had Washington's definition of American military policy in times of peace been accepted, had Washington's plan for a "peace establishment" been known and followed out, the whole military history of the United States would have been changed; many disastrous defeats might have been avoided, many expensive "victories" been made unnecessary; and in particular the worst horrors of war, the early horrors that inevitable accompany a lack of proper preparation, would have been greatly lessened, perhaps escaped altogether.

Enter the Prussian Drill Master

But the plan Washington advocated was ignored; it was not only put aside at first by Congress, but it was lost among the records for more than 125 years. The actual existence of Washington's plans was unknown when we fought the War of 1812; when we fought the Mexican War in the 1840's; unknown to Lincoln in 1861, to McKinley in 1898, and, believe it or not, unknown to Woodrow Wilson in 1917. Not till 1920, when our present National Defense Act was formulated and adopted, was Washington's plan put into force and made the basis of our peace-time military policy. And even then the plan was not re-discovered; it was re-invented. Actually not till 1928 was the following now famous letter found,¹ written in 1784 to Washington's beloved comrade in arms and Inspector-General from the days of Valley Forge to the end of the Revolutionary War, General Baron von Steuben:

"I have perused with attention the plan which you have formed for establishing a Continental Legion, and for training a certain part of the arms-bearing men of the Union, as a militia in times of peace; and . . . I very much approve of it. It was no unpleasing and flattering circumstance to me to find such a coincidence of ideas as appears to run through your plan and the one I had the honor to lay before a committee of Congress in May last . . . "

"A peace establishment ought always to have two objects in view; the one, present security of posts and stores, and the public tranquility; the other, to be prepared, if the latter is impracticable, to

(¹) Foot Note: The letter referred to and the facts regarding the Washington-von Steuben plan for National Defense, herein described, were brought to light by General John McAuley Palmer (grandson of that Palmer of the same name who served as a Major General in the Civil War and later as Governor of Illinois and United States Senator, and was the nominee for President of the Gold Democrats in 1896.) The present General Palmer was the official military advisor of Senator James W. Wadsworth, Jr., Chairman of the Military Committee of the Senate in 1919-20, which drafted the present National Defense Act. The results of General Palmer's exhaustive researches are presented in his book "*Washington-Lincoln-Wilson, Three War Statesmen.*"

resist with efficacy the sudden attempts of a foreign or domestic enemy While men have a disposition to wrangle and disturb the peace of society either from ambitious political or interested motives, common prudence and foresight require such an establishment as is likely to assure us the blessings of peace, although the undertaking should be attended with difficulty and expense; and *I can think of no plan more likely to answer the purpose than the one you have suggested, which, the principles being established, may be enlarged or diminished at pleasure, according to circumstances.* It therefore meets my approbation and has my best wishes for its success."

What was this plan which Washington so eagerly advocated, which was mislaid and overlooked for more than a century, which is now the basis of the National Military Defense? How does this plan relate to our present National Guard?

On April 14, 1783, General Washington had written suggestive letters to half a dozen of his ablest generals. The Revolutionary War had come to a close of victory for the Colonies a few weeks before. England had given up the struggle. We had won the privilege of forming ourselves into a nation. The army which had fought and conquered was about to be disbanded; its great Head was about to retire (he supposed permanently) into private life. As always, he was looking into the future. As always, one objective reached, he was considering the next. How to maintain what had been achieved? The letter he sent to General von Steuben reads as follows:

"My dear Baron:

"A Committee of Congress is appointed to consider what arrangements it will be proper to adopt in the different departments with reference to a peace.

"Colonel Hamilton (this was the famous Alexander Hamilton) who is Chairman of this Committee, has written me on this subject wishing to know my sentiments at large on such institutions of every kind for the interior defense of these States, as may be best adapted to their circumstances and conciliate security with economy and with the principles of our Governments.

"I wish therefore to be favored with your thoughts on this subject as soon as possible that I may compare them with my own and be able to comply with the request of the Committee in as full a manner and with as little delay as can be"

Von Steuben's Plan

Washington could not have imagined that "as little delays as can be" in taking advantage of von Steuben's views would magnify itself to one hundred and thirty-four years! And yet it was Baron von Steuben's scheme, not as he immediately formulated it but as he thought it out during the ensuing year, that roused Washington's "best wishes for its success."

Incidentally, it is extraordinary that von Steuben should have been the man to devise such a plan. For he had been a Prussian soldier under Frederick the Great, a man of regulations and forms, a drill-master par excellence, trained to belief in a centralized standing army and in that only. But coming to America to offer his services to the Colonies, he had not only done them an enormous service, but had himself become an admirer of democratic principles, a citizen of the New World in spirit as well as in fact. And so he became convinced that a large standing army of "regulars," or even a small standing army theoretically expansible to a large force in an emergency, was no solution of the problem of military defense in a democratic government. The solution, as Baron von Steuben worked it out, was in the formation and maintenance of a "well-regulated militia."

Notice the adjective. The whole force of the plan lies in it. A *well-regulated* militia.

In the idea of using militia in time of war there was nothing new. In fact, it was the use of militia, but ill-regulated militia, that had plunged the Colonies into despair, and almost into destruction, in the Revolutionary War just passed. An ill-regulated militia had been George Washington's own pet agony. "To place any dependence upon militia," Washington had written Congress in 1776, "is assuredly resting upon a broken staff." And later in the same year he wrote again, "Short enlistments and a mistaken dependence upon militia have been the origin of all our misfortunes and the great accumulation of our debt."

But von Steuben did not propose national defense by militia in war. He proposed the organization and maintenance of a *well-regulated* militia in peace-times, for the *prevention* of misfortunes and an accumulation of debt. Washington himself had thought out the same general conclusion; and he instantly recognized the soundness of the regulations in von Steuben's plan, so "coincident in ideas" with his own. A well-regulated and disciplined militia, he thereafter repeated again and again, is "the only palladium of a free people"; it must be considered as "the palladium of security, and the

first effectual resort in case of hostility."

Von Steuben estimated the numbers that might be required *for that time* at 21,000 men, expansible to 42,000 on mobilization. (Proportional figures for today would be about 300,000, expansible to 600,000 on mobilization). He proposed that the ranks be filled by enlisting volunteers for three years. Each of these young men was to be paid a small bounty, armed and uniformed at public expense, and called into training camps for one month of each year. The force was to be divided into localized units of 3,000 men each, to include two small brigades of infantry, a squadron of two troops of cavalry, a battalion of artillery of two batteries, and an organized field train. These seven divisions might be further reasonably separated into fourteen, thus making possible their billeting each in a small area.

The Stumblings of Ignorance

Such an organization was, when Steuben planned, unheard of anywhere. Switzerland had had compulsory citizen service for centuries, but this was different. A territorial military organization based on the distribution of population to facilitate nation-wide standardized military training, localized military units, and decentralized mobilization, was not perfected even in Europe till long after von Steuben had gone; and it was not adopted by us for 136 years! We drifted into the war of 1812, and nearly lost it, unhelped by the use of this utterly forgotten scheme. We plunged, North and South, into the War of the Rebellion, with neither section thus organized, and horrified the world and one another by our unpreparedness. Even when in 1914 it was sadly evident that we might be dragged into the World War, we still avoided reliance on von Steuben's, on Washington's pioneer but forgotten plan, though we had then three years to put it into nation-wide trial before the actual day of our entrance into the war came—and how many lives, how much money, we might have saved, if when we put our moral influence into the balance on the side of the Allies, we had had a physical influence that Central Europe did not and could not despise.

Why, even after the war with Spain, when the United States at last began to discover the folly of complete military unpreparedness for war, did none of our military experts, none of our statesmen, re-discover, or at least re-invent, the details of the Washington-von Steuben plan for national defense? Why did we continue even then until after the World War to depend *primarily* upon the principle of an "expansible" regular army—expansibly by the pyra-

minging upon it, *base in air*, of millions of untrained and immediately untrainable volunteers?

British Soldiers Strike Young America a Deadly Blow

This is too long a story to tell here. Partly because of the worst single blow the British struck us in the War of 1812—the destruction of Washington's plan in the burning of the Capital in 1814. It was bad enough to lose the buildings of state; it turned out to be worse that the record of Washington's eager advocacy of von Steuben's plan of "territorial organization" should be lost. Had the First President's "approbation and best wishes" for that scheme been preserved and known to the country, the force of his reputation must have much earlier brought it into effect. Alas that the flames set by the British order should have consumed A GREAT IDEA, as well as merely wood and plaster!

But partly also, no doubt, because the United States has always been (and still is) reluctant to *think through* the matter of military defense—a generous, heterogeneous eagerly democratic nation, a nation of those "common people" whom Lincoln said the Lord loved, and who hate war so sincerely that we hate to think of the possibility of war at all. So in making plans for military defense, we have tended not to concentrate our best thoughts; we have approached the whole business, as it were, shamefacedly. For these and other reasons, historical, traditional, and psychological, we delayed our best judgment for more than a hundred years.

But now, under the National Defense Act of 1920, and as since amended, what is the place of the National Guard today? What system, and what details, have we finally arrived at?

It is a genuine mystery that so few in this country should know, even in general, the answer to this question. For make no mistake: the National Guard today is the FIRST LINE of military defense in this country; not the second line. In this whole country, from the northern tip of Maine to the southern tip of California, there are not sixty thousand "regulars." Whereas if in an emergency the President of the United States should order—as he has a right to order—the mobilization of the National Guard to any one area, nearly 300,000 could be assembled, equipped *and transported* to that area within ten days, no matter where that area might be, and trained for the job.

A little way back the question was asked, why after the Spanish War, at least did none of our military experts re-invent the Wash-

ington plan? The implication of that question is not wholly fair. After the Spanish War, which in spite of its brevity and decisiveness, made the plight of *ill-regulated* militia in war-time glaringly apparent, one great step forward was taken. A president came on the scene famous as an outstanding hero in the confusion and mismanagement of the affair in Cuba. More fortunate still was his choice of a Secretary of War, whose great mind rose above the turbid waters of partisan politics, and mere local considerations. The "General Staff" was born, and the "War College" started under his personal direction. And the militia system was lifted from the low level of *mis-regulation*, at least towards the high plane of sound regulation, suggested by Washington and his generals during those fruitful weeks of consideration in the closing moments of the Continental Army of the Revolution.

First Steps in Revival of Washington's Plan

The State troops, known as the National Guard, were now placed, after a fashion under federal patronage. Types of organizations were specified by the central government, equipment and uniforms were issued, and pay and expenses were provided for a summer training period. The relationship in the matter of the Guard was made contractual, between the States and the Federal Government. The latter furnished stipulated supplies and money, provided the states maintained certain organizations, drilled and instructed according to Federal plans. As time went on, regular officers began to appear at the summer camps, from the newly organized staff college at Fort Leavenworth, to serve as instructors while fulfilling the requirements of the law ordering Federal inspections. Officers of the Guard began to seek assistance of the best talent of the Regular Army. Special camps were established as schools of instruction for officers only, no enlisted men attending.

In 1911 Congress authorized an increase in the strength of the officer corps of the Regular Army to provide "year round" instructors for the National Guard. Even "tactical divisions" were organized. On paper, it is true; but nevertheless for the first time in peace the great battle unit—the "division" of infantry, cavalry, field artillery, engineers and special troops—came into being in a "militia" organization. The still undiscovered plan of Washington was being approached; this was the first appearance in American history of General von Steuben's "team practice" in training. Too bad that the child should have been a foundling, exposed to the reproach attaching to unknown parentage!

For the World War came before the Washington plan was at all perfected, before the child was grown. No foundation of adequate arsenals of supplies, equipment and munitions had been created. There were still no trained staffs. A thousand and one items of necessary equipment for teaching were still lacking, from heavy guns to filing systems. Many an unfit officer had not yet been eliminated. Some states, providing their own funds, had developed a strong military organization; in others the regiments were hardly more than political or social units. But even though war pounces on the unprepared, American troops of the Guard fought with high courage and high honor on the great battle-fields of Europe. Eleven of the 29 divisions deployed against the enemy were from the National Guard. They stormed the Hindenburg Line, crossed the Meuse in the face of the foe, fought in the Argonne, helped to clip off the St. Mihiel salient.

The Almost Fatal Delays in 1917-18

When? The when was the rub. Fifteen months elapsed after the declaration of war before any sizable bodies of troops were even partially ready for the conflict. Fifteen months! The other day the War Department carried out certain military exercises in New Jersey, on the basis of the actual conditions which would have to be met were America opposed by a group of hostile powers. National Guard troops were moved directly from their armories in the Middle West to New Jersey, detrained, and marched all night, to deploy at dawn in strange country, as densely overgrown as the Argonne, and attack immediately! No fifteen months of training available here. In the plans, there were not even fifteen minutes allotted for training; every hour, every quarter hour, was absorbed in mobilizing, concentrating, marching or deploying. True, in these exercises only the staffs were actual; the men themselves were theoretical. There was no money for the movement of the actual troops. But the actual troops *were available*; and but for economic reasons *could have been* mobilized, transported and fought in the same way and in the same period of time.

What has happened in the development of the National Guard since the World War?

Under the provisions of the National Defense Act of June, 1920, and as amended, the whole status, organization, equipment and training of the National Guard has been changed. The entire military system of the United States has been made an effective nucleus for a genuine "citizen army," for a *well-regulated* militia, closely following the lines proposed by Washington and von Steuben. As-

tonishing, is it not, that when the National Defense Act was passed, the Washington plan should still have remained undiscovered; that when it was finally found it should confirm with amazing prevision every detail of the present system? One hardly knows which of those two things is the more incredible; yet both are true.

The Present Military Set-Up

The National Defense Act provides for adequate higher staffs of Regular Army officers, an adequate Regular force for the initial defense of the Panama Canal and Hawaii, a small Regular expeditionary force, *and Regular officers and enlisted personnel to serve as instructors for the other components of the National Army.*

The second component is the National Guard.

The third component is formed of the Organized Reserves—a purely skeleton organization in times of peace, but capable, as we shall see, of being made immediately effective on the outbreak of any hostilities; for the “skeleton” has a vital and tremendous brain.

The supplement of these components is the R.O.T.C. and the C.M.T.C., under Regular Army supervision, providing the peacetime schools for producing officer material, and gradually replacing the men of war experience.

Our immediate war army, in a major emergency, would consist of approximately 20 percent regulars and 80 percent National Guard troops. Note the proportions. Eventually, but far more rapidly than in 1917 and 1918, this immediate army would be completed by a million and a half, or as many more as needed, of men drawn into the ranks of the existing skeleton organizations of the Reserve force. In not more than six months, this Reserve force would be fully ready for service.

Now, what is the basis, the principle, of the second component, the National Guard?

The National Guard is enlisted by the *states*. The National Defense Act provided that the number of enlisted men (in the first year) shall be “for each state in the proportion of 200 for each Senator and Representative in Congress from such State . . . and shall be increased each year thereafter in the proportion of not less than 50 percentum until a total peace strength of not less than 800 enlisted men for each Senator and Representative in Congress shall have been reached.” This permits approximately 450,000 as a peacetime strength. There are actually about 185,000 today. Later, in this article, the particular deficiencies in the present strength will receive further consideration.

National Guard Truly Representative of the People

These troops are enlisted from, and drilled in, the communities of their respective states. They are available, under the state executives, for service within their states. But they are paid, uniformed, and equipped by the Federal Government, and their training is assisted by Regular Army officers and non-commissioned officers on duty with every regiment, brigade and division. They are organized into tactical divisions, camped every summer at Federal expense, and inspected in detail twice a year by boards of Regular Army officers to determine whether or not the prescribed standards for training, organization and equipment are maintained. And in accordance with these contractual obligations of the Federal Government, finally settled in 1933, the neighborhood State troops are now subject to instant call by Congress and the President of the United States, and can be made immediately available for service. It will be seen at once that by this arrangement the Guard is both local *and* national. Divided, it would fall; united, it stands. It is an organization wholly compatible with our democratic institutions, and yet admirably suited to our national military necessities *should they arise*. The partnership between Washington and the States is made intimate; while the interest of communities in the husbands and sons in the local military unit remains direct and personal. The whole is closely knit into a great system of organization and supervision, and yet the democracy of the Guard is unimpaired.

The National Guard is organized into 18 infantry divisions and 4 cavalry divisions. The Infantry Division is the great battle team—infantry, tanks, artillery, aviation, engineers, signal and special troops, medical personnel and supply trains. The Cavalry Division is a smaller organization, similar in many respects, but with cavalry regiments in place of infantry. The Commanding Generals of the nine territorial areas of the Federal military establishment exercise constant supervision over the training and equipment of the various divisions of the Guard, and keep up to date their plans for its instant emergency mobilization and recruitment. The great Corps Area supply depots carry the additional equipment to bring the Guard to a war basis. The Corps Area staffs and the National Guard Divisional Staffs are well known to each other. Daily there is a Regular Army officer in touch with every regiment of State troops, and others on duty at each local division headquarters. And yet, *except in a national emergency*, the troops are wholly "militia"—that is, wholly local STATE troops, appealing to local pride, and

serving, directly, day in and day out, year in and year out, local and state interests! "Our Guard is not to be disturbed by the Federal Government in time of peace." This is the effective, this is the democratic, this was the GEORGE WASHINGTON method for maintaining a real military force for local and national defense.

Does not your knowledge of history and any recollection of the methods followed by nations in declaring war, as in February 1904, and August 1914, indicate that in the event of a future war the United States would not be given months, or even weeks, in which to make initial preparations; that in war the OUTSET COUNTS?

Present Deficiencies Demand Attention

Beyond any doubt the principle on which the organization of the National Guard rests is unassailable. But that principle is not being put into effect quite as its importance demands. None of its divisional organizations, for instance, are complete. Of the Infantry divisions, all lack various parts essential to their employment in campaigns. Only one division has its full complement of artillery. One division has no engineer regiment, others lack various companies of engineers. No division has its required complement of special troops or trains. Only one division has its full medical regiment. And so on. The eighteen Infantry Divisions are said by experts to vary in completeness of organization from 90% to 76%, and the situation of the Cavalry divisions is still worse.

Further, except for two weeks at or enroute to and from camp, only 72 hours of training per year are provided for. It has even been proposed seriously to cut down the number of paid drills (\$1.00 a drill) per year to 12. And this in spite of the fact that almost forty percent of the Guard members were in 1934 out of regular employment, and many of them even lacked carfare to come to the drill halls. Congress cut in 1933 by 50% the maintenance allowance for keeping uniforms repaired and clean. The States constantly looked to the Guard, and frequently used it, to maintain order in cases of public disturbance—to the everlasting honor of the Guard, *both sides in any public quarrel generally welcoming their presence*, as in the instance of the Kohler riot in Wisconsin last August, when Governor Schmedeman was urged by the factory employers and employees alike, and by the Sheboygan municipal authorities, to keep the Guardsmen in Kohler Village as long as possible; or even more strikingly, in the coal-fields around Taylorville, Illinois, when both sides objected to the calling out of the Guard, and later were still more insistent that the Guard should not

be removed. The effect of this incompleteness of organization, and particularly of these small economies, for they are even in total very small, on the men is not good. It is not demoralizing, for the Guard as organized stands too firmly for demoralization; but it is distinctly weakening of morale.

Why is this Washington-principled territorial army, this first line of militia succor, this "cheap defense of the nation," as Burke called honor, not the pet and pride of the nation? There can be only one reason. The people of the nation do NOT KNOW much, they really know hardly anything about the National Guard. If knowledge could be substituted for ignorance, it seems almost certain that a wave of public opinion would sweep up to Congress, demanding that the plan of Washington, so long forgotten, so long needed, so recently put into force, the plan at once so democratic and so efficient, so state-serviceable and so nationally necessary should be finally and completely fulfilled.

[THE END]

RGG

A.P.C. from Maj-gen-Rechin,
Pres of Nat-Guard Assoc.

See P. 1 after P 80 of the text.

R.C.3⁵⁰

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